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Abstract 
 
 Local councils in New South Wales (NSW) have the authority to invest 
ratepayers’ money that is not currently required for any other purpose by the council.  
At the end of 2006-07 financial year local councils in New South Wales had invested 
$590 million dollars in structured financial products such as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDO).  By the end of January 2008, six months later, the market value of 
these investments dropped $200 million to $390 million.  Since then the financial 
investment market has further significantly reduced with the value of the councils’ 
investments losing many more millions of dollars.   In NSW the state government 
commissioned a review of the financial exposures of NSW local councils to be 
undertaken by Mr Michael Cole.  The Cole Report published in 2008 found that while 
acting within the parameters of the Local Government Act (1993), local councils had 
pursued high return high risk investment strategies.  This paper reviews and evaluates 
how the local councils in NSW, identified by Cole as having a high level of exposure 
to these forms of investments, have disclosed their financial investments in their 
2007-08 financial reports; the type of audit opinion expressed on these reports; and 
the impact of these investment related losses on the ability of NSW local councils to 
provide current and future services.  
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Introduction 
Local councils in New South Wales have been given the authority under 
section 625 of the Local Government Act (1993) to invest monies that are not required 
for immediate use in a range of financial instruments. This authority to invest monies 
that has been derived from the ratepayers within each community, and is not required 
for immediate use, has a number of restrictions with respect to the types of allowed 
investment types, which have been imposed by the NSW Department of Local 
Government.  
 
The NSW Department of Local Government is a State Government regulatory 
agency responsible for implementing the Local Government Act of 1993. In addition, 
the department also provides policy advice to the NSW State Government, manages 
the relationship between councils and the State Government and is responsible for the 
financial framework under which local governments operate (DLG 2008a).  The other 
major role undertaken by the NSW Department of Local Government is to work with 
the councils so they are able to appropriately deliver services to their communities 
(DLG 2008a). 
 
This paper looks at the significant financial exposure, identified in the Cole 
report (2008), of a number of councils in NSW that had in relation to their 
investments in structured financial products such as collateralised debt obligations 
(CDO) and the impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc who 
managed many of the councils’ investments. The paper also considers how those 
councils have disclosed their exposure to CDO’s in the financial reports of 2007/08, 
how their auditors have addressed the problem through their audit reports and the 
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potential impact on local councils in NSW ability to continue to provide services for 
their constituents. 
 
Background to local government structure in Australia 
 Australia operates under a three tier government system consisting of Federal 
(Commonwealth) government; state government and, local government comprising 
the third tier (Boon et al, 2005). The Commonwealth (Federal) government oversee a 
federation consisting of six states and two territories and have been granted the 
authority under the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1900 (Burritt and Welch 1997). 
Within the States and Territories are local government councils who, in Australia, are 
responsible for, building and maintaining roads, developing infrastructure for 
essential services, such as water supply, providing waste removal, community 
sporting facilities and care services such as child and aged care (Boon et al, 2005).  
The State and Territory governments are responsible for specifying the powers and 
responsibilities of the local government entities within each state (Boon et al, 2005).  
This paper focuses on the local government councils in the Australian state of New 
South Wales (NSW). 
 
Councils in New South Wales 
In NSW the first piece of legislation to establish a system of local government 
was passed in 1842 under the NSW South Wales Constitution Act 1842.  This Act 
provided the Governor of NSW power to create a to “create district councils for the 
purpose of constructing and maintaining roads, police services, water supply and a 
variety of other local services and infrastructure requirements” (Dredge 2001, p. 358).  
The Governor was also given the power to appoint the wardens and councillors to the 
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28 district councils he [and it was always a he] had established (Dredge 2001).  This 
Act was repealed in 1858 when the Municipalities Act 1858 passed.  The Act 
introduced the notion of representative government; however the population of some 
of the municipalities were of a size that it was not financially possible for them to 
undertake the tasks for which they were created (Dredge 2001).  Like the 1842 Act the 
Municipalities Act 1858 was repealed and the new Act was passed in 1867; however 
the problem of financial inefficiencies with small councils continued (Dredge 2001). 
 
After Federation in 1901, when “the separate colonies of the then British 
Empire in Australia decided to join together” (APH 2008, p.1), a new Act was passed 
in 1906 which recognised the needs of non rate paying members of the community.  
According to Dredge (2001) this Act “represented a great advance for local 
government in NSW, establishing the major principles by which modern local 
government operated (2001, p. 365).  The principles of the 1906 Act were reflected in 
the 1919 Act which was in place for the next seventy four years until the current NSW 
Local Government Act 1993 was passed.   
 
The NSW Local Government Act 1993 reflects the changes society has 
experienced over the past one hundred years including the significant economic and 
technological changes and the changing requirements of society and society’s 
expectations of local government.  The 1993 Act was meant to include provisions to 
accommodate the changes society has undergone by emphasising “greater 
accountability by councils to their communities; more professional management of 
the day-to-day activities of councils; and increased flexibility to devise methods of 
efficient service delivery and the performance of regulatory activities” (Dredge 2001, 
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p. 370).  However, the two main limitations imposed on local government remain; the 
relatively small size of councils which inhibits financial effectiveness and the level of 
power held by the State government. 
 
One way to overcome the associated efficiency problems of small councils has 
been the development and implementation of a number of reforms to the financial 
reporting requirements of local governments.  These reforms, which included 
identification and reporting on key performance measures and reporting on a financial 
year basis rather than a calendar year, occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
were promoted on the basis that they would improve the usefulness for decision 
making and enhance accountability (Carnegie 2005).  The next section will discuss 
the financial reporting obligations of the NSW local government councils and the 
audit of those financial reports. 
 
NSW Local Government Act 1993  
Section 413 of the NSW Local Government Act 1993 [hereafter the 1993 Act] 
requires NSW councils to prepare each year financial reports which include the 
general purpose financial reports of the council as well as a an audit report which 
includes the opinion of an external auditor on the general purpose financial reports.  
The general purpose financial reports of the council are to be audited by the council’s 
auditor within four months after the end of the financial year (section 416) and the 
auditor is to issue a report which includes a statement “as to whether, in the opinion of 
the auditor, the council’s accounting records have been kept in accordance with the 
requirements” (section 417).  This is similar to the normal reporting requirements of 
private sector organisations however the objectives of private sector organisations are 
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significantly different to those of a local government council.  The local government 
councils are there to support and provide specific services to their local community.  
Many of the assets of local government councils are considered to be public goods 
which differ to private sector assets because public goods are generally non-rival and 
non-excludable (Barton 2002, p. 43).  For example public parks and roads, these are 
public goods available for all members of the community and the use of these goods 
by one member of the community does not deprive another member of the community 
use of the public good.   
 
 The other area of commonality, in relation to the financial reporting and 
financial accountability, between private sector organisations and local government 
councils is found in section 422 of the 1993 Act which outlines the requirements for 
the appointment by the local government council of an external financial report 
auditor.  This commonality creates a level of confusion as the financial reports of 
most public sector organisations are generally audited by a state audit office.  For 
example Federal government organisations in Australia are required to have their 
financial reports audited by the Australian National Audit Office, while State 
government entities are audited by the State government’s Audit Office.  However, 
the NSW local government councils are required to “appoint a person as its auditor” 
who is a registered company auditor, or a partnership or corporation which includes a 
registered company auditor (section 422).  In addition the local government councils 
are required to undertake compulsory audit tendering every six years (Boon et al, 
2005, p. 221).  One of the outcomes of compulsory tendering has been the 
introduction of “significant on-going competition to the local government audit 
market in NSW to produce long-term savings” (Boon et al, 2005, p. 222); however is 
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this outcome what members of the community would expect? The result of 
competitive tendering for audit services has resulted in reduced quality of audits due 
to the necessary budget constraints arising from lower audit receipts (Houghton et al, 
2003, Karen 2002). 
 
The next section will outline the financial exposure, due to investment in 
various investment schemes, of the NSW local councils with particular focus on 
collaterised debt obligations (CDOs) and the investment bank Lehman Brothers 
Holding Inc. 
 
 
NSW Local Government Exposure 
Sikka et al explain that since late 2007 there has been a “deepening banking 
and financial crisis arising from sub-prime lending practices by banks, which in turn 
has restricted the availability of credit and has led to what has come to be described as 
a ‘credit crunch’”  (2009, p. 136).  There have been numerous accusations about who 
should be blamed for the crisis from the over reliance of neoliberal ideologies 
believing the market is able to take care of itself, to the excessive greed of those 
charged with the running and directing the financial institutions (Roskham 2008, p.9) 
and poor government regulation (Zingales, 2008) and “market complacency brought 
about by several years of positive returns” (Zingales, 2008, p. 2).  Whatever the 
reason, whoever is the cause, the end result is very clear, the global financial markets 
have, and continue, to decline.  The impact of the financial crisis has been widespread 
and profound.  Many people have lost their jobs, many have lost their life savings and 
investments and others have seen their superannuation balances decrease or even 
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disappear.  Significant impacts have been felt by a wide variety of individuals, as well 
as organisations such as councils in NSW.   
 
In the financial year 2007-08 the NSW the Local government sector was a 
$7.3 billion industry with the councils collecting $3.5 billion in rates and charges 
(DLG 2008b, p. 6).  Unlike the majority of other public sector organisations the local 
councils in NSW have been allowed under the 1993 Act, to invest in a variety of 
investment schemes for the purpose of earning additional revenue.  As at 30 June 
2007 the face value of the total investments of NSW local councils totalled $5.7 
billion.  Given the size of the investments, which have varying degrees of risk, and the 
fluctuating economic conditions in 2007 (DLG 2008c) and the growing global impact 
from the sub-prime crisis in the United States, the NSW Department of Local 
Government commissioned a review of the councils investments.  In April 2008 the 
final report, the Cole Report, of the commissioned Review of NSW Local 
Government Investments was published.  The purpose of the review was to verify the 
total investment exposure of NSW local government councils as well as determine the 
extent of unrealized losses from these investments (Cole 2008, p. 3).  This report was 
commissioned to address the NSW State government’s concerns about the impact of 
the decline in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States on the investments 
of councils.  The following table outlines the exposure identified in the final report 
Investment Type Face Value @ 
30/6/07 ($m) 
Market Value @ 
31/1/08 ($m) 
Estimated Loss 
($m) 
Estimated Loss 
(%) 
CDO 590 390 200 34% 
Capital protected 450 400 50 11% 
Managed Funds 2,420 2,350 70 3% 
Subordinated debt 600 600 Nil Nil 
Term Deposit, 
cash, bills 
1,630 1,630 Nil Nil 
Total 5,690 5,370 320 5.6% 
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Council funds are primarily composed of two types; short term working 
capital, which accounts for approximately 70% of the total, and longer term funds 
comprising the 30% residual, which includes capital expenditure commitments (Cole 
2008, p9). While it appears that councils have maintained higher levels of security 
over the short term funds by investing in traditional fixed interest products, which 
does not appear to be the case with respect to the longer term investments. The 
purpose of investing long term funds should be to ensure that the return generated is 
sufficient to negate the negative impact of inflation on future capital works. However, 
Cole (2008) highlighted that NSW councils were attracted to higher prospective 
returns available by investing in new investment types that differed from the 
traditional fixed interest products (p9-10). 
 
These new investment types were specifically engineered to meet the 
requirements of the Investment Order (refer Appendix 1) and while compliance with 
the conditions were essential to allow councils to invest, it should not have been the 
only or sufficient requirement to qualify these types of investment, as NSW councils 
are also required to comply with their fiduciary responsibilities as trustees of public 
funds (Cole 2008, p10). Commonly the principle investment amounts were credit 
rated or bank guaranteed, however the income stream from the investments were not. 
Simple compliance with the Investment Order was a liberal interpretation, of fulfilling 
the requirements and expectations associated with managing public monies, and did 
little to account for the risk associated with these types of financial instruments.  
 
The biggest exposure for NSW local government councils is in relation to the 
investments in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) where the investments are in 
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“asset backed securities whose underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of bonds 
or bank loans” (Duffie and Garleanu 2001, p. 41).  The face value of the investments 
in CDOs dropped from $590m in 30th June 2007 to $390m on 30th June 2008, an 
estimated loss of $200 million (Cole 2008, p. 3).   
 
The main promoter of CDO’s to the NSW local government councils was 
Lehman Brothers who were “notorious for marketing investment schemes to local 
councils which have resulted in those councils losing millions of ratepayer’s dollars” 
(Roskam, 2008, p. 9).  Unfortunately for millions of investors, including NSW local 
government councils who invested in Lehmans Brothers’ financial investment 
schemes and the people employed by Lehman Brothers, the investment bank filed for 
bankruptcy on 14th September 2008.  Zingales suggests the aggressive leverage policy 
of Lehman Brothers’, “bad regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency 
brought about by several years of positive returns” (2008, p. 2) led to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers.  This collapse, of the fourth largest investment bank in the United 
States, “is generally credited with precipitating the near total collapse of confidence 
that subsequently engulfed the international monetary system” (Roskam, 2008, p. 9). 
 
In response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers the NSW Department of Local 
Government issued a Council Circular to all NSW councils, two days after the 
collapse, on the 16th September 2008 requiring councils to “seek urgent financial 
advice as to their potential exposure to Lehman Brothers, as a matter of urgency.  
Councils are required [emphasis added] to identify investments that have direct 
exposure to Lehman Brothers and outline the effect it may have on the Council’s 
activities” (DLG, 2008c).   
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The Cole report (2008) estimates that overall NSW councils have lost $320 
million from their investment portfolio, which represents 5.6% of total investments 
and 15.2% of long term funds (p11). The problem with interpreting these figures is 
that most of these losses are from unrealised investment portfolios and the valuations 
of future returns have generally been provided by those that were also involved in 
marketing the products to councils. Therefore the future returns may potentially be 
significantly overstated and Cole (p11) identified the exposure in one case to be 85% 
of the capital investment. Additionally, a number of councils are holding 45% of their 
total investments in financial instruments; such as CDO’s, which potentially have the 
greatest risk of loss. 
 
NSW councils seem to have pursued a policy of either chasing higher returns 
or allowing themselves to be lured into investments containing higher risk factors than 
they have traditionally accepted. It is unclear if there was a true understanding of the 
relationship between higher risk and return trade-off. The up side of accepting higher 
risk was capped at “a couple of percent above the risk free rate” (Cole 2008, p11), yet 
the downside, as stated previously, has been recorded as 85% of the original 
investment. This suggests that some local council’s failed to understand that taking on 
higher risk could generate higher returns or potentially higher losses. 
 
The following section discusses the audit function which NSW local 
government councils use to assess the quality of their financial statements. 
 
Audit function 
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Sequeria and Johnson state that “the audit function has assumed the role of 
conferring credibility on the financial statements and ensuring that the statements 
could be relied on for decision making” (2004, p. 94).  ASA 200 (2007) states “the 
objective of an audit is to enable the auditor to express an opinion as to whether the 
financial report is prepared in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable 
financial reporting framework.  The auditor is required to obtain a level of certainty 
that will enable them to provide ‘reasonable assurance’ about the correctness of the 
financial reports”.  This terminology demonstrates that the auditor does not provide a 
guarantee of complete accuracy, by reason of the normal conduct of an audit.  The 
auditor conducts tests and collects evidence in respect of the accuracy of accounts, but 
does not audit all transactions or balances.  Therefore to reduce the chance of material 
misstatement, areas that are judged by the auditor to be high risk are likely to attract 
greater attention.   
 
Boon, McKinnon and Ross explain that stakeholders need to have confidence 
that the audit report is reliable so they are able to make appropriate informed 
decisions on the financial reports (2008, p93).  To improve the level of confidence in 
the financial statements, and the subsequent audit report, organisations use external 
independent auditors to conduct the financial statement audit.  External auditors, 
“auditors independent from the entity” (Gay and Simnett 2007, p. 765), when 
conducting an audit of local government councils’ General and Special Purpose 
Financial reports are required to prepare a report on the council’s financial reports 
which includes a statement as to whether, in the opinion of the auditor [emphasis 
added] the financial reports have been prepared as required, are consistent with the 
council’s records and fairly present the financial position of the council (1993 Act, 
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section 417 (2)).  The purpose of the audit is to provide assurance about whether the 
financial reports have been prepared in accordance with both the relevant accounting 
standards and with the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial 
Reporting.  However, providing assurance does not guarantee there are no errors, 
omissions or that no fraudulent activities have taken place.  Rather the audit reports 
are supposed to provide a level of confidence that the financial information provided 
can be relied upon, particularly by the stakeholders of the councils in making 
decisions based upon the financial information contained in the financial reports.   
 
The audit profession is no different to other professions; it requires its 
members to be independent through avoiding other economic ties with the client, and 
to be absolutely objective in their approach to the audit and the client (Umar and 
Anandarajan, 2004).  To be able to issue an appropriate audit opinion, one of the 
fundamental principles of professional ethics is that of objectivity which is the 
principle that “an auditor should not allow prejudices or bias, conflict of interest or 
undue influence of others to override professional or business judgement” (Gay and 
Simnett 2007, p. 17).  To meet the fundamental principle of objectivity it is vital that 
auditors are and are seen to be independent.  This view is consistent with Arens et al 
(2007) who explain that to be independent an auditor must be free from any bias in 
relation to all aspects of the audit engagement  
  
The following extract from the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
outlines the requirement of independence of external financial statement auditors: 
Independence requires: 
Independence of Mind 
The state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without 
being affected by influences that compromise professional judgment, 
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allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity 
and professional skepticism. 
Independence in Appearance 
The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a 
reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant 
information, including safeguards applied, would reasonably conclude 
a Firm’s, or a member of the Assurance Team’s, integrity, objectivity 
or professional skepticism had been compromised. (APES 110, Section 
290.8) 
 
To determine if an auditor is independent, all the relevant circumstances, 
including all relationships between the audit client and the auditor need to be 
considered (Hayes, 2002, p6).  However there are an increasing number of barriers to 
audit independence such as the expansion of the provision of non-audit services, 
which has resulted in a decline in the relative importance of audit fees, co 
modification of the audit, resulting in lower profits, reduced skill and reduction of 
resources allocated to the task (Hayes 2002, p. 3). 
 
The independent auditor is required to issue an opinion about whether the 
financial reports of the council being audited provide a true and fair view of the 
financial position and are in compliance with the Accounting Standards and relevant 
financial reporting regulations.  There are two main opinions an auditor can issue for 
a local government council’s financial statements: an unqualified opinion which 
indicates the auditor is of the opinion that the council’s financial statements do not 
contain any material misstatements and are a true and fair view of the council and are 
in compliance with the Accounting Standards; and a qualified opinion is where the 
auditors are of the opinion the council’s financial statements contain certain 
circumstances which are material or are likely to be material (Gay and Simnett 2007) 
and may, if relied upon by decisions makers, result in an incorrect decision being 
taken. 
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The assessment of materiality and relative importance of qualitative and 
quantitative factors are matters for the auditors’ judgement (AuAH 2009, p56). Items 
that represent more than 10% of the balance of any account are normally considered 
material, items that are between 5% and 10% of any account are normally only 
material at the discretion of the auditor and items that are less than 5% are normally 
considered not material. However, the overriding factor is if inclusion or exclusion of 
the information would influence the decision making process of the users of the 
reports. Therefore items that only affect an account by 1% may be judged to be 
material if the auditor believes that providing information about the matter may affect 
the stakeholders’ decision making process. 
 
The importance of independence of financial report auditors can not be 
underestimated however independence does not guarantee an appropriate audit 
opinion: 
“As independent experts, auditors claim to be able to mediate uncertainty and 
construct an objective account of business affairs to enable shareholders and 
significant other to manage risks.  This construction of reality is legitimised by 
appeals to a variety of standards, benchmarks, techniques and bodies of 
knowledge, but such claims are precarious as they are routinely undermined 
by periodic scandals, crisis, frauds, emergence of new technologies, patterns 
of trade and changes in capitalistic economies” (Sikka et al 2009, p. 136). 
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It should be clear that performance indicators (such as financial reports) ought 
to be “both audited and publicly disclosed” in the interests of accountability and 
transparency (Carnegie, 2005, p85). 
 
 NSW councils invested in CDO portfolios in the hope of generating higher 
than normally returns from their long term investments. These investments were 
aggressively marketed, including by Lehman Brothers, as complying with the 
Investment Order for NSW Local councils. This order requires councils able to invest 
to invest in those securities that had a minimum credit rating from Moody’s 
Investment Services Inc, Standard and Poor’s Investment Services Inc or Fitch 
Rating. Prior to the downgrades that subsequently occurred, the investments by NSW 
local councils were AAA, then AA and AA-, which met the minimum requirements, 
however by February 2008 they were CCC-. Yet even prior to the downgrade the 
market was strongly suggesting that the “credit rating was far too optimistic and 
would significantly deteriorate” (Cole 2008 p11). 
 
 Funds held by NSW local councils, that they are allowed to invest, fall into 
two categories and are classed as restricted or unrestricted in respect of their final use. 
In particular restricted funds may have additional conditions related to them. These 
funds include monies from developer contributions, environmental levies, or leave 
entitlements. However reporting by councils appear to pool together these funds 
leaving it unclear where they have invested funds to meet particular liabilities or long 
term investment strategies (Cole 2008 p 18-19). Councils seem to fund their long term 
liabilities from a single pool of investments irrespective of whether the funds have 
restrictions placed on them or if they are associated with particular liabilities (Cole 
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2008 p19).  This makes assessing councils ability to fund particular long term 
liabilities extremely difficult. Cole (2008) made some recommendations and 
suggested that councils should be reminded of their inability to “contract out” 
fiduciary responsibilities to external funds managers, that product manufacturers be 
banned from providing advice to councils, and that the NSW DLG should release a 
formal model of investment guidelines (Cole, 2008 cited in Gold 2008 p42). One of 
the major impacts of local council losses from CDOs is that much of these funds were 
earmarked for future projects.  These projects will not only be impacted by these 
losses, but will also be impacted by the decline in value of the funds due to 
diminished or nil returns. In addition the impact of inflationary pressures will also 
make those projects less viable and possibly require additional funds to complete. 
  
Audit Reports 
Analysis of the audited financial reports of NSW council’s show that a large 
proportion of external auditors used the exact same wording for reporting on CDO’s, 
and in some cases within specific accounting firms used a standard letter of 
qualification with spaces to hand write in details such as page numbers.  This 
highlights that these were generic reports, which therefore raises concerns about the 
independence of these audit reports and the level of effort in undertaking the audit.  
Commonality of wording both within audit firms and between audit firms could be an 
attempt to create a common response to the issue which would be an indicator of lack 
of auditor independence. 
 
Auditors that conducted audits of a number of councils also formed a variety 
of opinions.  There was no evidence to suggest that they just assumed problems due to 
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the sub prime mortgage market, which suggests that the audits were probably 
conducted independently.  However the format of the qualified report on the sub-
prime problems was generally consistent not only within particular audit firms but 
also between audit firms.  This suggests that audit firms have applied a standard 
reporting form to disclose issues relating to the sub prime mortgage market problems 
and in the cases of the councils that Cole (2008) identified as at risk, all had qualified 
audit opinions identifying the uncertainty related to valuation of CDO investments. 
While this could be expected, it was surprising to discover that the values reported 
were the same as reported by Cole in February 2008. This implies that councils and in 
turn the auditors accepted those values without reporting the continued decline in 
value. 
 
Other findings from the review of the financial reports have shown that the 
audit fees disclosed within the reports are ambiguous, with separate audit fees relating 
to a number of audit functions including, but not limited to, audits of the financial 
reports.  This raises questions with respect to the independence of auditors if there is 
fee reliance on additional audit functions.  Craswell (2002) suggested that qualified 
audit reports are a strong indicator that independence has not been compromised, due 
to the competitive nature of auditing.  This may not be true in the public sector if there 
are limited firms willing to engage in auditing of local government bodies.  If it is an 
indicator then the high proportion of qualified audit reports would show that 
independence is being maintained. 
 
The introduction of competitive tendering for NSW local government 
financial statement auditing in the 1993 Act has introduced the possibility that 
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auditors may experience greater time budget pressures.  A recent survey concerning 
reduced audit quality identified 48% of participants admitted to having to reduce audit 
quality practices during the completion phase of the audit, which includes the review 
for subsequent events (Coram, Ng and Woodliff. 2003).  This would suggest that with 
complex issues such as the losses related to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, auditors 
may not allocate sufficient time to determine the full extent of the losses.  
 
Future research 
 
This research has highlighted a number of areas of interest for further 
research.  Why has there been a standard reporting method of the sub-prime issues?  
Is it a result of suggestions from the local government association, ease of completion, 
or a perceived need to be consistent in reporting? As identified by Cole (2008) there is 
a need for a standard analysis and reporting method to be developed for local 
councils. 
 
Councils are required to report the fees that they have paid to auditors and the 
financial reports show these fees.  However, there does seem to be a lack of clarity as 
to what those fees are for.  For example some council’s have shown an audit fee 
presumably for the audit of the financial reports, and then have also shown other audit 
fees.  While it is likely, and may be presumed that the other audit fees are for audits of 
particular sectors such as OHS, water or environment, it needs to be clarified for a 
number of reasons.  For example, if the same firm is conducting the additional audits, 
and the fees earned from the addition work is substantially greater than from the audit 
of the financial reports, there may be some compromise of the independence of the 
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financial audit.  Likewise it may affect the competiveness of the tender process if 
some firms are unable to conduct the additional audits. 
 
Another factor arising from this research is that councils do not separate funds 
that relate to particular liabilities or that have separate restrictions associated with 
them. There are also inconsistencies among the accounting policies that therefore 
impede transparency (Cole 2008 p24). Current reporting policies seem to ignore the 
risk that particular products may need to be liquidated prior to maturity triggering 
losses that would need to be reported. One solution to this would be to promote the 
use of current market valuations across the full range of investment products. There 
seems to be a strong need to improve consistency of the reporting, and the accounting 
methods used to account for, and value these products. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Sourced from Cole 2008 
